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von Lehe: Commercial Transactions

COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
I. SALS
A. Judicial Decisions
In GMAV v. Herlong' the plaintiff was the assignee of a
conditional sales contract. An acceleration clause gave GMAC
the right to demand full payment in the event of default. A
buffer provision in the contract further specified that GMAC's
acceptance of late payments would not amount to a waiver of
the right to demand specific performance. On numerous occasions GMAC accepted late and partial payments, and this, without the protective provision, would have amounted to waiver.2
The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the provision
was applicable only in the event of the defendant's default
subsequent to the plaintiff's acceptance of late payments. On
August 3, GMAC accepted a late payment and two days later
it invoked the acceleration clause. Due to the fact that the
defendant had not defaulted after August 3, the non-waiver
clause was held to be inapplicable.
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Grain Dealers Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Juian4 held that title to a motor vehicle can pass
without compliance with the Title Certificate Law and reversed
the lower court's ruling that a certificate of title was indispensable to ownership. The court found the certificate law merely
regulatory in character and cited authority holding that
although a certificate of title is prima facie evidence, 4 this
presumption of ownership may be overcome.6 This decision is
in line with earlier cases holding that compliance is not a
necessary requisite of ownership.6
The defendant in Southt, Carolina Tax Commn v. Schafer
Distrib. o.7 received an "emergency" request from Shaw Air
1. 248 S.C. 55, 149 S.E2d 51 (1966).

2. Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. Grooms, 198 S.C. 118, 16 S.E.2d 816 (1941);
Welch v. New York Ins. Co., 183 S.C. 9, 189 S.E. 809 (1937) ; Empire Buggy
Co. v. Moss, 154 S.C. 424, 151 S.E. 788 (1930).

3. 247 S.C. 89, 145 S.E2d 685 (1965).
4. S.C. CoDu ANN. § 46-150.11 (1962).

5. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 244 S.C. 552, 137 S.E.2d 785 (1964); Porter
v. Hardee, 241 S.C. 474, 129 S.E.2d 131 (1963); cf. Lynch v. General Acc.
Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 327 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1964).

6. Clanton's Auto Auction Sales v. Young, 239 S.C. 250, 122 S.E.2d 640
(1961).
7. 247 S.C. 491, 148 S.E.2d 156 (1966).
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Force Base for the delivery of beer. Upon delivery he was
charged with violation of South Carolina law which prohibits
the sale of beer on Sunday. The supreme court held that the
sale took place at Shaw which is under the jurisdiction of the
United States courts.
A sale is made where the acceptance of the offer takes place,8
and here the court found from the intention of the parties that
acceptance was conditional upon delivery. The court agreed
with the lower court's dictum that if the beer had been destroyed
before delivery to Shaw, the loss would have fallen on the
seller. No authority was cited for the proposition, and it is
doubtful that this would necessarily follow in a risk of loss
question in all jurisdictions.
In South Carolina risk of loss passes when title passes.9 The
Uniform Commercial Code'0 clarifies the risk of loss issue by
making delivery the key. Risk of loss generally will pass in the
absence of a breach when the goods are delivered. Thus the Code
significantly changes existing law."
B. Recent Legislation
An amendment to section 46-150.27 2 of the South Carolina
Certificate of Title Law, pertaining to scrapped, dismantled or
otherwise destroyed motor vehicles, makes the existing law more
specific and imposes a stringent sanction.
If the vehicle is less than five years old, the transferee of the
vehicle, in most cases a salvage yard owner, is required to send
the vehicle's certificate of title, license plates, registration card,
and the manufacturer's serial plate to the Highway Department. This is to be done within fifteen days after purchasing
or obtaining possession. The requirement also pertains to insurance companies who have acquired ownership of salvage vehicles
through settlement of claims and to owners of such vehicles who
scrap, dismantle, destroy or abandon them.
If the vehicle is more than five years old, owners who transfer the vehicle for wreckage or salvage, or who scrap, dismantle, destroy or abandon it must deliver only the certificate of
8. 77 C.J.S. Sales § 6 (1955).
9. John Frazier & Co. v. Hilliard, 2 Strob. 309 (S.C. 1848).
10. UNIFORM COUMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-509(3).

11. Supra, note 10 (S.C. Reporter's Comments).
12. S.C. CODE ANx. § 46-150.27 (1962), as amended.
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title to the Department. The penalty for non-compliance is
imprisonment for not less than six months or a fine of not less
than 500 dollars, or both. For a second violation, a fine of 1,000
dollars or imprisonment for one year, or both, is imposed.
II. CHATTM SECURITY

A. Judicial Decisions
Embassy Men's Apparel, Inc. v. Lyman Printing & Finishing Co. 13 involved notice to the plaintiff of a pledge against his
newly acquired cloth. The cloth purchased from Cottontex by
the plaintiff was in the possession of the defendant who had
previously contracted with Cottontex to finish it. In the agreement the defendant secured a pledge.
The defendant, in its answer to the plaintiff's claim for possession, argued that the plaintiff had notice because it knew, or
should have known, of Cottontex's financial instability and its
inabiliy to obtain credit. The lower court sustained a demurrer
to this defense because it felt that to allow it any sufficiency in
law "would require every purchaser of cloth to investigate the
financial stability of the seller."' 4 In reversing, the supreme
court held: "Whether or not the circumstances .

.

. were such

as to place the plaintiff upon inquiry as to any claims the defendant might have had against the property in its possession
is .

.

. to be determined upon the trial of the case."'"

B. Recent Legislation
A small loan act, 16 regulating loans of 7,500 dollars or less,
17
repealed the 1962 South Carolina Small Loan Companies Act
which pertained to loans of 200 dollars or less. The act provides
for licensing of persons engaged in making such loans by the
State Board of Bank Control which is to investigate the books
of the lenders at least once each year. If the board finds violations, petition to the circuit court may be made.
13. 247 S.C. 471, 148 S.E.2d 158 (1966).
14. Record, Embassy Men's Apparel, Inc. v. Lyman Printing & Finishing
Co., 247 S.C. 471, 148 S.E2d 158 (1966).
15. Embassy Men's Apparel, Inc. v. Lyman Printing & Finishing Co., 247

S.C. 471, 148 S.E2d 158 (1966).
16. S.C. Acts & J. Res. (1966), p. 2391.
17. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 8-701 (1962).
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Section 14 states the maximum interest and charges in lieu of
interest permitted, which are dependent upon the amount of the
cash advance of the loan. The penalty for violation of the act
remains the same as that imposed by the Small Loan Company
Act-a fine of not more than 1,000 dollars and not less than 100
dollars.
An amendment to section 37-6051s of the South Carolina Code
exempts certain surety companies from the deposit of a 50,000
dollar surety bond required by the prior existing law. If the
surety company has complied with the provisions required of
insurance companies in the 1962 code, it is relieved of making
the deposit.
III. COMnBnmcIA

PAPER

Snyder'9

The case of Elliott v.
presents two interesting questions: (1) What constitutes proper tender? and (2) What constitutes a worthless check?
The defendant gave the plaintiff a check on December 31,
1962, in payment of an installment due on a land contract. On
that date the defendant did not have sufficient funds on deposit
to cover the check. On January 3, he made a sufficient deposit
by another check and his account was conditionally credited.
The December 31 check reached the bank before the bank could
clear the January 3 check and it was marked "drawn against
uncollected funds." A bank employee said of this: "It means
that . . .we are holding funds until we get collection on the

20
check that he has deposited."
Had the plaintiff attempted to cash the check on the day he
received it, this would have been a case of improper tender
because it would have been drawn against insufficient fundsa worthless check. The court held that offering the check was
not improper tender because a check is accepted on the condition that it will be paid when presented to the bank.2 ' Even
though this check was not paid when presented to the bank the
court felt that it was not worthless, holding that the check was

18. S.C. CODE AxN. § 37-605 (1962), as amended.
19, 246 S.C. 186, 143 S.E2d 374 (1965).
20. Record, Elliott v. Snyder, 246 S.C. 186, 143 S.E.2d 374 (1965), in hold-

ing 13 of Master's report.
21. The court cited Surety Indemn. Co. v. Estes, 243 S.C. 593, 135 S.E2d

226 (1964); Burns v. Prudence Life Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 515, 134 S.E2d 769
(1964); Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Barringer, 175 S.C. 145, 178 S.E. 505 (1935).
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sufficient compliance with the terms of the contract to prevent
forfeiture. The notation, "drawn against uncollected funds,"
had the effect of placing the plaintiff on notice that before it
declared forfeiture it had to either redeposit the check or make
an attempt to collect from the defendant.
The court found the rule to be unusually flexible and held this
check not worthless, even though it was worthless when received
and was not paid when presented to the bank. But on the other
hand the court certainly did not want to declare a forfeiture
which is so disfavored that courts seize upon slight evidence to
prevent it. 22 The court was faced with two opposing policy con-

siderations: The policy against forfeiture and the policy favoring strict compliance with the law of commercial paper in order
to protect commercial stability. The result in this case, though
ambivalent, could be considered fair. However, under different
commercial circumstances, e.g., a 1,000,000 dollar check or the
risk of drawer declaring bankruptcy, it is doubtful that the
decision would have been the same.
South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Lake City State Bank23 is 24a
sequal to Singletary 6 Son, Inc. v. Lake City State Bank
decided in 1963. The result in the South Carolina Nat'l Bank
case was predicted by the survey article of that year on Commercial Transactions. For a full discussion of the fictitious
payee situation under the Negotiable Instrument Law and the
Uniform Commercial Code see 17 South CarolinaLaw Review 9
(1965).
Jom- C. voq Lnnn

22. See Palmer v. Sovereign Camp W.O.W., 197 S.C. 379, 15 S.E.2d 655
(1941) ; Lane v. New York Life Ins. Co., 147 S.C. 333, 145 SE. 196 (1928) ;
Cope v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 123 S.C. 532, 133 S.E. 440 (1926).
23. 246 S.C. 287, 143 S.E2d 584 (1965).
24. 243 S.C. 180, 133 S.E2d 118 (1963).
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